In conversation with Vice Admiral Angus Topshee, Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy
Canada’s coastline is by some distance the largest on the planet. Its coastal waters lie across three oceans; the Arctic, the Atlantic, and the Pacific. And its strategic outlook encompasses two geopolitical arenas stretching across the Atlantic into Europe, and beyond its western coast into the Indo-Pacific. How does one make sense of the geostrategic priorities necessary for keeping Canada and its interests at sea secure? And how does Canada look to maximise its influence through the use of its navy? We speak to Vice Admiral Angus Topshee, Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy to explore these themes and more.
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How has the maritime threat landscape changed through the course of your career?
I joined a Navy in the 1990s who’s entire focus had been Europe and the Cold War with the USSR. The Royal Canadian Navy did operate in the Indo-Pacific occasionally, but it would still always be in the context of the ongoing great power politics. With the break-up of the USSR, however, the Navy changed its focus. We moved to conduct interdiction operations to break up illicit trafficking, we committed ourselves to the security of trading networks, and to overcome piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, Straits of Malacca, and through the Caribbean. Today, the pendulum has swung back round to the central importance of great power politics, and the impacts of countries that wish to disrupt the rules-based order. We’re also seeing issues now relating to countries not being able to patrol their territorial waters and, consequently, control their resources.
Against that context, how would you define your key priorities?
Our first task is to defend Canada and North America. In terms of missions, that means patrolling and, if necessary, defending our waters. Changes in our far north – in the Arctic Ocean – have made some of that task even harder. We also need to be able to deter hostile activity, a task ably carried out by our submarine capability.
Speaking of the Arctic, how have changes in the North informed your approach?
In 2021 a Canadian warship transversed the Arctic for the first time since 1954. With climate change, we’re seeing increased shipping traffic through that part of the world, and in line with the Law of the Seas, Art 234 of UNCLOS, we have the power to ensure any ships in the region comply with Canadian law. Our presence in enforcing that is critical for monitoring types of vessel, the number of people on board, the environmental impact, and more. The distance and geography present huge challenges for operations in the region. For example, it is easier to get from Halifax, on the Canadian East Coast, to the United Kingdom, than it is for ships to get to the Canadian arctic. I consider it an expeditionary mission and we have to ensure we arrive in the area fully self-sufficient and not a burden on the local communities.
You refer to the sheer size of Canada; sitting across three oceans and the longest coastline of any country. How do you define your ‘near neighbourhood’?
This is the central strategic challenge for Canada; what is our natural region – and where can we best lend our support? We’ve spent time in the Caribbean region, we’ve strong links to Europe, we’ve deployed to both the Atlantic and Indian Ocean coastlines of Africa, and as a Pacific nation we have a strong interest in East Asia and the South Pacific. It remains difficult to define natural affiliations given the diversity, spread and geographic distances involved. Our challenge, therefore, is to consider where do we deliver the greatest marginal benefit. Can we focus on a few limited areas, align all the resources of the Government of Canada, and try to have maximum impact?
Commentators increasingly define the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region as the new fulcrum of geopolitics and economic productivity. Given your Pacific coastline, is it coherent to speak of a singular geopolitical area stretching from Canada to Kenya?
It is certainly a critical area. Many of the world’s emerging great powers have a strategic interest in the region. In terms of coherency as a singular space, one could question many geopolitical spaces; I could make the case that there is no coherent Europe, for example. It is also about the nature of theatre we’re speaking about. The Indo-Pacific is a maritime theatre. The actors in the space have a tremendous reliance on the seas, invariably this brings greater distances closer together. To help illustrate this in our minds I’ve started asking my staff to show a map with the Pacific Ocean at the centre. Canadians understand intuitively the link to Europe, however, when you centre the world on the Pacific you understand both the importance of the oceans and the breadth of countries along this geographic area.
A characteristic of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ is also the significant number of Commonwealth countries spread across the area. What do you see as the major opportunities for Commonwealth maritime cooperation?
Our Deputy Prime Minister laid out a proposal on how to build deeper alliances and partnerships with likeminded states, not only in ‘the West’, but beyond that. The Commonwealth gives us a really good architecture for these partnerships. There’s a common background and understanding. The core question should be on how to build resilience to protect countries against some of the challenges we’re seeing, whether that’s the prevalence of Illegal fishing or encroachments on sovereignty. We see massive opportunities to partner with countries and work together against these.
From a Naval perspective, Canada can offer capacity building, space-based systems, and the leveraging of Canadian technology to monitor their ocean resources. We are absolutely mindful, however, that these partnerships are only effective when equal and mutually beneficial. We have a huge amount to learn from all partners.
With an eye on the future maritime landscape:
a) What are the capabilities you see as possible ‘game changers’?
A big question is whether the oceans become more transparent; and we can detect or see all submarines. Or do they become entirely opaque; and submersibles become incredibly difficult to track. In response to either scenario it is clear that drones – autonomous vehicles of all types – are going to be a part of that picture.
Institutionally, we need to be alert to game changing warfare and create a culture of innovation. Our sailors need to be comfortable in thinking about the problem set in front of them and suggest solutions for senior leadership to examine.
b) How do you think the nature of threat will change? And what specifically worries you?
I don’t think we fully appreciate the dangers of certain IT systems and how algorithms are distorting the way individuals perceive the world. At the end of the 19th Century a sudden boom in the affordability, accessibility and availability of print media helped fuel extremist ideologies, and broadened their ability to reach the masses. There are parallels with the digitisation and democratisation of information. We know now that the first half of the 20th Century was blighted by conflicts of political extremism. It is feasible that we could see something similar – particularly with the involvement of non-state actors.
On a personal reflection – what have been the guiding principles that have helped forge your career?
The number one thing; I’ve always needed to understand the ‘why’ of something. ‘Why is it important?’, and ‘why are we doing it?’. We must always be able to understand and explain why we’re doing something. And in turn, that helps people to work out the ‘how’ of doing something. This makes us more thoughtful, and allows for taking the opportunity to step back and reflect as well as properly ‘red-teaming’ decisions. To properly question and challenge assumptions you need a diversity of thought. The more people with different outlooks you have exploring a problem and unpacking it, the more likely it is that you’re going to find a robust solution.
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